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Once we acknowledge and accept our finitude, we can concern 
ourselves with living well, and care first and most for the well-
being of our souls, and not so much for their mere existence . . . . 
(L. Kass cited by Callahan, p . 75) 
As the generation of the baby boom has made its way through its life 
span, various institutions of our society have felt the strain of its numbers . 
In our youth, it was the educational system which first felt the impact. Now 
it is the economy and job market and , as we approach old age, the pinch 
will be felt elsewhere. This is evidenced in the growing political attention to 
services and care for the elderly. Combined with significant advances in 
modern medicine , we are facing what Daniel Callahan calls "a 
demographic, economic, and medical avalanche." 
It is not surprising, therefore , that the perennial question of rationing 
health care has been discussed with more urgency in recent years. The 
second half of 1987 saw the arrival of a new book by Callahan, director of 
the Hastings Center medical ethics research institute , which addresses this 
concern. His book, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society , 
suggests rationing of medical care , in part, on consideration of age. The 
purposes of this volume are to "stimulate a public discussion of the future 
of health care for the aged . .. " and to "propose a different way of 
understanding that care than is commonly considered : that of using age as 
a specific criterion for the allocation and limitation of health care" (23). 
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In taking up this call for public discussion, I wish to review Callahan's 
proposal, assess its strengths and weaknesses as a contribution to the 
debate over health care rationing, and suggest directions to push analysis 
further. 
Callahan's analysis ranges over a variety of topics - the meaning of 
aging, the goals of medicine, moral relations between the generations, and 
resource allocation. It is useful, therefore, to begin with a summary of the 
general principles of his position. Callahan states them as follows: 
I. Government has a duty, based on our collective social obligation, to help 
people live out a natural life span, but not actively to help extend life medically 
beyond that point. 
2. Government is obliged to develop, employ, and pay for only that kind and 
degree of life-extending technology necessary for medicine to achieve and serve 
the end of a natural life span: the question is not whether a technology is available 
that can save a life, but whether there is an obligation to use the technology. 
3. Beyond the point of a natural life span, government should provide only the 
means necessary for the relief of suffering, not life-extending technology. (137-38) 
Within this framework of principles, then , let us look more closely at 
specifics of Callahan's proposal. Although the economic concern of 
escalating medical costs remains constantly in the background of his 
discussion, Callahan sees the issue of limits to health care to the elderly 
within a broader philosophical context. He asks us to consider, for 
example, the question of the meaning of aging. Old age, he suggests, has 
been robbed of meaning (the internal sense of one's life as purposive and 
coherent) and significance (the social recognition of the value of old age) . 
He sees this failure as derived in large part from what he calls the 
"modernization of aging". This he describes as arising from the belief that 
human ingenuity, using the tools of reason and science, can make all 
spheres of nature, including the aging process , malleable to human 
manipulation, directed at the creation of an increasingly better future (26) . 
This, in turn, has resulted in an inability to deal directly and honestly with 
the possibility of finding significance in suffering and decline. And it has 
issued in the "medicalization" of old age. The power of the meaning of the 
inevitability of decline and death has weakened against the increasing 
vision of old age, or the elements of aging, as medical problems which, like 
other medical problems, are amenable to intervention, manipulation, and 
conquest. 
A Callahan Suggestion 
In contrast, Callahan suggests that old age be seen as one of several life 
stages in a natural life span, each with its own meaning and significance 
and set within a social web of cooperation among generations. Old age as 
such, rather than the accidental qualities of some elderly (free time, 
spendable income, etc.) should be seen as meaningful. Although he does 
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not spell it out with sufficient detail and clarity, Callahan appears to find 
that meaning in the concept of service to the future by means of serving the 
young. 
If the young are to flourish , then the old should step as ide in an active way, 
working until the very end to do what they can to leave behind them a world 
hopeful for the young and worthy of bequest. The acceptance of their aging and 
death will be the principal stimulus to doing this. It is this see mingly paradoxical 
combination of withdrawal to prepare for death and a n active, helpful leave-
taking oriented toward the young, which provides the possibility for meaning and 
significance . ... (43) 
Coorelative to Callahan's analysis of the meaning of aging as service to 
the young is his discussion of the responsibility of the young toward the 
old. This is part of his stress on intergenerational obligations, of social 
ethics. As in an earlier article (1985), Callahan struggles to establish the 
philosophical grounding for moral responsibility of the young toward the 
old. He examines, and in turn finds weakness in, several traditional 
arguments for the filial obligation of children toward elderly parents: 
reciprocity for earlier support by parents, ties of emotion, implied 
"contractual" obligations , friendship, and gratitude (88-91). Failing to find 
an unequivocal principle for obligation among these, Callahan posits the 
uniqueness of the origin and nature of the parent-child bond as a product 
of a sui generis period of nurturance, intimacy, and sharing. This combines 
with what he calls the "power of need and dependence" to be a potent basis 
for a claim of obligation (91-94). 
Callahan's struggle at this point results, I believe, from his failure, when 
borrowing the analysis of family obligation from his earlier article, to 
transpose it to the socia! ethical framework proposed in his current book. 
It is not a question of the relation of individual children to individual 
parents which should be central here, but rather the intergenerational 
obligation of upcoming generations to those who precede them. In that 
light, the answer to Callahan's search for a basis of obligation lies in the 
nature of the organism - i.e., society - which is the focus of his analysis. 
If we are, in fact , to see ourselves as a socia! organism - with those in each 
life stage playing an interacting role - then the very reciprocity of roles 
may be a foundation for obligation. As the old prepare the way for and 
make way for the young, the young provide the care context for that role to 
be played . This also furnishes a clearer framework for Callahan's attempt 
to balance familial and societal (governmental) sharing of responsibility 
for the elderly. Both have obligations to the old. Physical help and 
affection are seen by Callahan as central to the role of children toward 
needy parents. On the other hand , basic economic and medical support 
- increasingly burdensome in the context of greater life expectancy and 
chronic illness among the elderly - can be shared by all "children" of one 
generation for the "parent" generation preceding them through 
government (and other social agencies) as an expression of inter-
generational moral ties. 
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Medicine in Relation to Elderly 
If acceptance of decline and death is part of the meaning of aging and it 
is the obligation of succeeding generations in society to help the elderly 
accomplish this in a meaningful way, how are we to understand the goal of 
medicine in relation to the old? Callahan proposes that "medicine should 
be used not for the further extension of the life ofthe aged, but only for the 
full achievement of a natural and fitting life span and thereafter for the 
relief of suffering" (53) . Recognizing that the quantity of life is not 
indefinitely extensible, he opts for the role of medicine as enhancing the 
quality of a reasonable life cycle. Of what would such a life cycle consist? 
Callahan describes it as one in which I) one's "life possibilities" - e.g. , 
work, love, family , social life, pursuit of ideals , and the experience of 
beauty, travel, knowledge, etc. - have had the opportunity to be 
accomplished; 2) one's moral obligations to others, especially family; have 
been met; and 3) one's death , because it comes after a full life, will not be 
felt by others as an offense to moral and social sensibility (66-72). He 
defines a "natural life span", then, as "one in which life possibilities have 
on the whole been achieved after which death may be understood as a sad, 
but nonetheless relatively acceptable event" (66) . Callahan specifies 
further that to be "tolerable" after a person has achieved this life span, 
death must also be characterized as "not . .. marked by unbearable and 
degrading pain" (72). 
This leads him to a statement of policy that medicine should have as its 
goals, both for current technology and research, the prevention of 
"premature death", i.e., death before the living out of the natural life span 
he has described and thereafter, the minimization of pain and suffering 
(148-49). Callahan's preference for quality over quantity of life is not 
unique in medical ethics. But the addition of its link to a concept of a 
natural life span does give it a somewhat different focus. The reason for his 
designation of this life span as extending approximately to the late 70s or 
early 80s, however, seems arbitrary and is probably based on present 
medically achievable life expectancies. Why the terminus would not be 
defined differently in past or future medical contexts is not clear. Nor is it 
evident that the greater life enrichment opportunities which are becoming 
available to older, healthy elderly persons can be dismissed as secondary 
to the fulfillment of "life possibilities" in his proposed definition of a 
natural,life span. Though he seems hesitant to do so, Callahan may have to 
accept greater flexibility in defining the chronological terminus in his 
concept of life span. 
Where Callahan's proposal has special merit is its application to medical 
research. Noting that physical mobility, mental a lertness , and emotional 
stability are often undercut by chronic illness, pain, and suffering, 
Callahan suggests that the focus of geriatric medical research should not 
be on life extension, but rather on. those conditions which diminish the 
quality of living for many elderly, e.g., dementia (characteristic of 
Alzheimer's disease) , hearing impairment, osteoporosis, osteoarthritis, etc. 
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Increasing Limitations and Costs 
Although his analysis of the meaning of aging, intergenerational moral 
relat ions , and the goals of medicine stand logically on their own, it is the 
rapidly increasing limitation of resources and escalating medical costs 
which had the most to do with provoking his desire to bring conscious and 
systematic consideration to the issue of allocation of society's medical and 
fiscal resources. Callahan sees the dilemma as real and not to be resolved 
by greater efficiency in medicine or reallocation from other areas of social 
expenditure (123-28) . Besides, he argues, approached from the modern 
medicalized view of aging, any savings gained in one area would be 
swallowed up by the - in principle - limitless vision of conquering the 
aging process. And, in any case , this search for "external" solutions fails to 
confront the more fundamental philosophical issues referred to above -
issues which should be faced regardless of the problem of limited 
resources. 
According to Callahan, public funding of medical care for the elderly 
should be based on a commitment by the young, both personally and 
through the institutions of society, to assist in the achievement of a 
"natural life span" and to allay "economic and social anxieties" associated 
with aging (118) . Such a policy is not a withdrawal of support for the 
elderly, but only a chronological limit to life-extending medical care. In 
other respects, this policy calls for expanded support in other elements of 
Medicare, Medicaid , Social Security, etc. In fact , in order to achieve his 
goals of a natural life span and a tolerable death, Callahan's policy may not 
be the allocation limitation program he seems to intend it to be. Achieving 
his goals may be just as increasingly costly as the life-extending medical 
care he wants to limit. Although there is limitation in the sense that both 
life extension and life enhancement are not pursued equally, it may be 
better to interpret his proposals more in terms of reallocation of resources 
within medicine. 
This policy leads to a termination of treatment (in particular, 
termination of publicly funded treatment) for the aged, based on three 
general criteria which, although they might be applied at any age, he sees as 
having added relevance for the aged. These are I) the inability to relieve 
pain and suffering; 2) disproportionate burden imposed by treatment; and 
3) inability to restore or maintain minimum quality of life. The latter he 
defines as the capacity to reason, to feel emotion, and to enter relationships 
with others (177-80) . 
Based on these criteria, Callahan outlines standards for morally 
appropriate (and, therefore, eligible for public funding) medical care for 
the elderly. These are based on considerations of the patient's physical and 
mental status and quality of life on the one hand , and levels of possible 
medical and nursing care on the other. Patients who are brain dead should 
be declared dead and no further treatment given. Those in a persistent 
vegetative state should be provided palliative nursing care, but death 
should not be resisted . Patients characterized by severe dementia, mild to 
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moderate impairment of competence, and those who, though mentally 
alert, are severely ill are appropriate recipients not only of palliative care 
but also general medical care, e.g. , antibiotics, surgery, nutrition and 
hydration , though primarily for relief of suffering rather than life 
extension. Both nursing palliation and general medical care should be 
available to those mentally alert persons who, though physically frail, are 
not severely ill. In addition, intensive care and advanced life support can 
be provided, though not for an extended time unless necessary to relieve 
suffering. Finally, a physically vigorous , mentally alert elderly person is 
eligible, even at public expense, for all levels of care previously described 
and, in addition, emergency life-saving intervention until such a time as 
the person deteriorates into one of the other categories (180-85) . 
Particulars are Debatable 
Callahan's attempt to give specificity to the definition and implementa-
tion of his policy is a worthwhile step. Disagreement over particulars is to 
be expected (Callahan himself sees his book as an initiation of a long, but 
necessary public debate). Callahan notes, but does not thoroughly discuss, 
several issues which are difficult both philosophically and practically, e.g., 
avoiding the creation of a coercive atmosphere in which an "obligation to 
die" might subtly be felt by the elderly; the establishment of sufficient 
social support for the elderly in other areas so that this limitation is not 
perceived as abandonment; the possible sense of injustice felt because only 
some persons may be able to pursue extended life apart from public 
funding; and pressures felt by families of those who wish to pursue 
extended life, but who are unable to afford it themselves. 
Callahan leaves many questions still open. But the author knew this was 
the case. His goal, he said, was to "stimulate a public discussion of the 
future of health care for the aged" (23). It is possible to find in this volume 
a thoughtful and sensitive attention to the broad underlying issues which 
should frame future debate on this topic - the meaning of aging, decline, 
and death; the relation of life extension and life enhancement as goals of 
medicine; a social ethic of mutual moral relations among generations; and 
an acceptance of distinguishing levels of appropriate care in achieving a 
tolerable death. 
In advancing this public debate, I see several necessary steps: I) 
Callahan has limited his analysis to setting medical limits for the elderly. 
Justice and the reality of the broad expanse of medicine will call for 
extension of this debate to other areas of health care also. The discussion 
may ultimately have to be framed in terms which, though they may include 
age considerations, cut across age boundaries per se. The recent Hastings 
Center report on "Ethical Challenges of Chronic Illness", (Jennings, 
Callahan, Caplan), may be an example of such a formulation . Similarly, 
one may be able to work toward a concept parallel to Callahan's "natural 
life span" which could refer to those at earlier points in the life cycle who 
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are facing more limited chronological expectations. This would allow the 
application of some of his principles regarding extension and 
enhancement of life to other persons for whom relief of pain and suffering 
may also take moral priority over mere prolongation of life. 
(2) It is not clear that the limits Callahan is proposing actually would 
produce absolute limits of resource usage. The pursuit of a natural life 
span and a quality-enhanced tolerable death may be just as expensive as 
following after life extension. The debate would more honestly, and 
therefore more productively, be cast in terms of reallocation of medical 
resources. In this context, issues of efficiency, technical advances, 
examination of other social priorities , etc. , may have more of it role than 
Callahan seems to give them. 
(3) Finally, in terms of Callahan's specific interest in old age, further 
work is needed on defining the meaning and significance of aging. A 
clarification of the relation between serving others and self-fulfillment is 
necessary. Furthermore, the increased opportunity for personal growth 
and life enrichment among the elderly can be given greater examination as 
to its implications for the concept of "experiencing life's possibilities". 
The significance of Callahan's discussion for the emerging public debate 
over allocation of medical resources, especially in relation to the elderly, 
will probably not be known for some time. Callahan himself recognizes 
that this debate, since it must result in a changed social consensus in order 
to have any serious structural effect on the provision of medical care in 
society, will not take place easily or quickly. But that he has drawn our 
attention to fundamental philosophical issues which should be as 
consciously addressed as they are subconsciously assumed is, to my 
thinking, already an important contribution. 
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